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.SPEECH  BY  CHRISTOPHER  TUGENDHAT,  COMMISSIONER  OF  !HE 
EUROP~~ C0~~1UNITIES,  TO  THE.  INSTITUTE  FOR  WORLD  ECONOMIC 
RESEARCH,HAMBURG,  MONDAY,  Jrd ~CH,. 1980 at 17.00 H 
.  ' 
.  ,  Y~.1o, 
"SC:::::  THOUGHTS  ON  TiiE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITIES  BUDGET" 
I~ gives me  great pleasure  to  come  to Hamburg 
·  cn.:i  talk to you  tod.::i.y,  r:.:>t. only  b~cause I  always  enjoy 
.rr:y  vis!..ts  to  the FederalRepublic,  but also because 
th2:-z  a;e good  reasons  w"hy, it is,  I  believe,  appropriate 
·for  r.~<~  to  ma~e this particular speech in Germany.  A 
'speech about  the  Corn::r:u~1i ty Budget  is especially relevant' 
'_,  .  .  .  . 
in .the r.:ost  economically successful Member  State qf the  ·~  ·.· 
.  •  '  •  '1-
co::::1Uni t 1 ,  cand  the  o~e which sets an example· of economic 
stability. ttl us all •.  I  want  therefore to share with you 
. scme  thoughts. about this Budget as it is now, ·and  ho~ 
it:' tr..e.y  develop in the future. 
T.'1e  Budget of the  European  Co~nities has in the 
past tended  to  be  seen as  ~o~~thing of a  political  .~:  · 
ba.ckvater,  th7  pres_erve of specialists and lawyers. who 
·.  '  ' 
have  succeeded in mastering .its very technical procedures  • 
• 
?· 
·'· -----------------------------
.. 
2 
However,  si~ce I  took over responsibility for this portfolio 
in the  Co::r.:dssion at the peginning ·of 1977  it 
has "n:oved  from  the political periphery to the centreiof the stage. 
There are several  reasons ·for this  change. 
I 
Firstly, it has  become  apparent that the Budget is 
' 
the  point at which  the Council of Ministers and  the  Eu~opean 
Parlia~ent clash,  and at whic~  _i~ important respects their 
powers  are defined.  Two  of the  last'_ three budgets have  been 
·subjects of dispute  between these ·two  institutions, which 
~ogether constitute the  Budgetary  Authorit~ and  the differences 
over the 1980  Budget  proved  so intracti1ble that the Parliament 
rejected_it altogether  • 
. On  both occasions  the dispute arose out.of a  fundamental 
_disagreement  about  the balance of the  Budget.  Throughout 'the 
CommUnity  ~here is growing unease  about  the pattern of Community 
-\ 
expenditure,  and particularly about  the way  in which it is 
dominated by agriculture, which in 1979  accounted for  some  .70'% 
. _/  of the. total.  This unease has  been strongly expressed in the 
.  '  .  '  . 
Parlia~e~t, and  ~s the second main reason why·tbe  Budget is now 
attracting so much  attention. 
'  ' 
·  The  third is the approach of a  financial crisis. It 
.  --
seems  li~ely that at some  point in i98l.or 1982  the  Community's 
_  financial  "0\m Resources" will no  longer be sufficient.  When 
that happens  wcmber  states will have  to face.up to  some  difficult 
problems .involvinz both income  and. expenditure if the Community· 
·is to avoid a  political crisis as well. 
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.. 
.  Finally.there is the problem of the unequai  w~y in 
which  the costs and benefits of the  Community  Budget are .: 
distributed among  the member  states.  This is a  source of 
~articular and understandable'concern in Britain.· It is 
of vit-ll  importance  for the  Community  that a  sat~sfacto,ry · 
solution to.the British problem sJ'lould  be  found with a. 
rrdnfrn;wv;  of ..:e_1ay,  b~t that is a  subject for another  speech 
- .s:-:d,  tho~z;h  sor..e. of  the _things ·I  have to.  say are relevant 
to  this'problem, it is not  the  focus  of my  remarks  this 
ever.ing • 
. . 
I  THE  BUDGET  AXD  THE  I~'STITUTIO~'S 
·, 
,,  . 
I  said that the Cornrnunity_Budget  involves  fundamental 
-
political arid  ~nstitutional issues,  and  I  would  sunmarise 
these. issues under  2 headings' (a)  : capaclty  to increase or 
curb expenditure and  (b)  legal significance of budgetary 
powers •. Before discussing these po.ints,  however,  I  should 
I 
explain briefly how·the  budg~t procedure  works~ 
, As  with 'almost all.Co-nity measures, it is the 
Corr.Ussion Which  initiates the  procedure by.drawing up the 
.basic I?udge't proposal  (the  "Preliminary Draft Budgetn).  This 
is then presented to  the  Budgetary Authority,  whi.ch  consists 
of both  the  European Parliament  and  the Council  of Ministers, 
and  foilows  a  procedure whose  sequence  and  deadlines are 
laid down  in some  detail  in Article 203 of .the Treaty of Rome. 
The  b~dget is given alternate readings  by  the  two  institutions, 
up  to  two  readings  each,  beginning with  the  C~uncil,.  It is, 
howev~r, the President of the Parliament alone 'wtio,  after 
t~e final  reading by Parliament,· can declare the·  budget. adopted 
or rejected. 
./.  ~ 
.  . '. 
'. 
4 - . 
(a)  C<?.o.ac! ty to alter expenditure aperopriations 
T'ne  respectiv;e  P?Wers  of .the Eux:opean.Parliament 
/  '  f  . 
and  the Council of Ministers  to alter expenditure · 
c:;:.prcp:-:!.~tions in  ~he Budget differ significantly.  They 
I 
ar.-e  eov.:::-r:_ed  by  tvp key factors!  the distinction in the 
budget  between "obligatory" a'nd."non-obligatory" expenditure,  .  . 
and  the existence ·of a  "rr.aximum .rate of increase" of rion- . 
obligatory  expenditure~ 
The  u..11usual  and  rather artificial distinction between · 
obligator/ and  non-obligatory  expenditure arises  from 
differences in the  procedures  l~id dowri  i,n the Treaty -·for 
app~oval of expenditure  "necessarily resulting from  this· 
Trea~y. or. from acts adopted in a·ccordance ·therewith 
·(Article 203/4_7) ",  the  so-called "obligatory" expenditure. 
and all ether expenditure. which is called "non-obligatory".· ·. 
The  obligat,ory ·  sec~ion,  .·making 'up  some  SO"t  of 
'  .  .  . 
'the budget,  i.s  mainly agricultural  spending  \Vhich,  because 
of the  open-~nded nature of the agricultural guara.ntees 11 
flo~.:s  automatically from  the annual  price•fixing by  the 
Council ot  ~~ricultural Ministers.  Since harvests  and 
worid-market  9evelopmen~s, ·or indeed the decisions of  the 
.  . 
agricultural ministers,  are not  always  easy  to predict with 
any  precision the  amounts  voted on this side of the budgeb  · 
have been seen as .estimates rather than as cash limits.  · 
·'· 
•. 
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I:h  ..  r~i:--:;:;  the  course of  ti1e  year supplementary budgets 
.· hav·e  often been required to meet  increased 
thus  altering the final balance 
of  the_bud2ct.  Because  the  pr~ce-fixing is  ~xclusiyely 
the  responsibility of  the Council,  (on  the  basis of 
'  ' 
Ccr.~ission proposals),  and because  of. the  limitations in 
the  Treaty on Parliament's capacity  to alter obligatory 
expei.:ditu~e~ this area· of  the- budget has ·been  se.en as 
~ffectively under the control of  the Council of Ministers. 
.  ·, 
r:...;.~ ·non-obligatory. expenditure,  on ·the other  han~, 
clearly  p~ov:!.~es for Parliament, within  ti:te  limits of  the·_ 
rr.axirm...."''l  r,1te,  to have  the  last word. ·  This  covers  a  wide 
·rang~ of  t~atters,  such as  regional,  social,  i~dustrial-and 
/  - ~  .,. 
energy policy v.'here  new  policies are  being developed but 
'  .  . 
"'+.ere  ~n cor.;psrisonto  the costs of  the  CAP  spending is· 
relatively small  nnd  Community  policies are not "very ·.far advanced. 
'Ihe  rr.axirr.um  rate of increase of this  non-obli~atory 
e::::'c:-..:!:!. tu_~:e  is declared by  the  Commission at the  beginning 
of the  buc:~et procedure  .. after technical  calc~latio~s on  GNP 
volu.-:-.i  trer.ds~  vari.ltions of national budgets  throughout 
and  the .trenq of  the  cost of living.· 
~:2::-:·.ber  Scates~/ The  Treaty  p_rovides  that the  maximum  rate 
can be  exceeded_,  but only with  the  agreement  o.f  a  weight~d · 
majority in both Council' and ?arliament. 
-.!. 
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This distinction between  diffe~ent ·types of spending 
and  the institutional  ~elationships it implied posed considerable  ! 
problens for a  new  directly-elected Parliament determined  to · 
exerci£e e2fective budgetary  powers  and  to establish a 
- . 
polL:::ically acceptable  budgetary strategy.  ·Had it accepted· 
the  O!"t:-:ociox  view_ of its appropriate  role it would  have  found. 
!.~se:.f  taking decisions of substance  only on  some  207.  of  the 
.  . .  . 
Bud;..;;t,  and  th.at within limits determined  l::!y  a  maximu:n  rate 
·\-:hich it regarded ss unduly restrictive, while·the other SOl. 
'  ' 
of  expen_diture  was·ef~ectively beyond its control  and  subject 
'  , 
to  no  lir:1itations  on its rate of increase.  The  qUestion fo'!-' 
·' 
Parliament was  how  in these circumstances it could create a. 
\r 
better balance  in the  Budget  between agricultural and· 
- ' 
non agricultural  spending;  particularly if it did not regard-
..  / 
si~ply pushing·up non-agricultural  spending as an adequate 
0. 
or appropriate, or indeed possible, means  of achieving this. 
objective. 
The  Parlia~ent's response was  to  challenge  the 
'  ' 
orthodoxy and  to  show  a  clear determination to insert 
itself into .the  process of deterrirl.ning  agricultural  spending 
'  .  -
through  the maximum ·use of its budg~tary .  powers·.··· It took 
up  previously unused devices which enabled it to  push  the 
. door slightly open,  raising  the possibility that its proposed 
alterations  :Ln  ob11.gatory expenditure could  be made  effective 
"-"i th  tl"le  support of a  sympathetic minority in Council•  ai'lD 
that ics  powers  to reject Budgets. and  Supplementary  Bu~gets 
could be  used  to apply approximate cash limits within 
-.which Agricultural Ministers would  have·  to work. 
·'· 
. 7 .-
This  radical  departure  from  previous  assumptions  about 
the  respectiYe  inst~tional roles ~aused much  fluttering 
.f 
in the  Council  dove-cotes,  and it was  in the  end a 
! 
coffibination of institutional  p~ide, unwillingness  by Ministers 
to  respond  to Parliament's concern about agricultural costs, 
· ar:d  the  Council's determination  to cut  propos.als in the 
-·  . 
non-obligatory sector, which  led  to  the  ~ection. by Parliament 
of the  1930  Budget. 
(b)  Le~islative and  Budg~tary'Powers 
. The  determination of  the directly-elected Parliament 
to assert to  the maximum  extent· its budgetary  rights is 
.  '  . 
better 4nderstood when  we  remember .that there is in the 
Community  a  separation between budgetary.and  legfsl~tiye 
power:.·  Tne  Council has  exclusive  ~egislative authority, 
while  the Parliament and  Council' together form  the  Budgetary 
Authority •. :,rhus  the Parliament's budgetary  powers  provide  . 
the only point in.the _Community's  decision-making  pr~cess 
witere it can determine  (as ppposed  to  simply influencing) 
the direction of Community  policy~ 
I· 
It is also quite a fundamental  question for  the 
institutions whether a-decision by  the  Budgetary Authority  - - . 
to. vote  funds tor a.  particular purpose has  legal effect 
.  . 
which  allows  the Commission,  as  the institution responsible · 
'• 
for implementing .the  Budget,  to spend  the money  without·any 
other legal base,  or whether it is necessary for the  Council 
to pass a  Regulation providing for  the  policy concerned before 
the Co::nission can  act~  If the  formerwere  to be  the case, 
then  the  significance of Parliament's budgetary powers  ~uld 
be greatly· enhanced. \  . 
It will cause you no  great surprise when  I  say that 
there are many  in the Parliament who  take  the view that a 
decision by  . the  Budgetary. Authori·ty alone  provid-es ~sufficient 
'  . 
legal  a].lthority for action in that field by  the  Commissio,n, 
\~-hile  ti-:3  Council of Hinisters is inclined towards  the view. 
. . 
that _a.Rc.:;ula.tion is necessary· in the  v~st majority of cases  •. 
_The  Co::::;:.ssictn  firids itself in the  position of rejecting both 
pu-:.·is t views  and operating on. the  basis  that the  b\.ldget  does 
not ah  .. ·:.y's  provide. S.:-1  adequate  legal 'basis for. action, 
-·  . especially w':Len  new policies are involved,  but that ,we  can 
'  . 
.  .  ' 
Without  a  Regulation carry out. an  ~'action ponctuelle'' as it 
. is called,  best  tran~lated as  a  well-defined ·and  specific 
'  ,,  . 
actionof a  limited nature. 
The  Resolution of Confl!ct 
It is,  I  think,  clear that our 
t 
t 
I 
I 
I 
I  . I 
budgetary  procedu_res  are in a  state ·qf  evolution _and  definition 
w-hich  has  irr.portant .. implicatiot'ls  for the relationships between 
CoiT':."l'!'...:ni ty institutions.  It is also clear that Parliament 
··and  Council  quite often disagree.  But,  yo~ may  ask, Why 
should  the institutions clash and  should there not be 
procedures  for resolving disagreements?  • 
The  answer is, first,  that  the institutional framework of 
the Com:rm:ni ty is designed ·to ensure  a  certain t.alance  and 
'  diffusion of power-between  the institutions and.that  some  tension~ 
bet\..·een  them is therefore !nevi  tab.le,  secondly that the 
effectiveness of  the decision-making process  d~pends on this 
'.  . 
b~ing a creative tension,  rather  than an element of disruption,  .. 
I 
I 
a:~.d  t~i-::-~:ny,  that the  instit'tt.ions have not always  made  good use t 
of  parts of  the procedures which are specifically designed to 
~2c!litate reconciliation of differences.  t 
.. I  • 
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T.~e.dlfferences_ between Council  and  Parlia~ent,  although~ 
they often involve ,aifferent  interpr~tations of legal texts, 
,f  ·- '  \  •  '. 
arc .ess:nti.::.lly political and it is appropriate  therefore 
'  . 
t:--..::t  t~~:-y  s:"'.:.:)1  .. l!.d  ~e resolved politically rather than by 
r  ~  .  .  -
pro~~ac::ed les&l t:ra:;gl.cs  bef,ore  the  European Court of Justice. 
L~'Je in the  budgetary  procedure  a  system of 
''  cq  ~1ci.:.:  ~..: ;o~t  •r  for  Parlia~cnt and 
d:. ffL::u:I. ties 
· p::·ocess .. ·  Ik£c1:.r::  dir~cc elections this device  r.-:as  r.ot  ~lways 
.  .  . 
t~·:::.th  t::e ·  i:rpo~t8nce it deserved,  largely .because· the·. 
C.xlc.:cil  t-;·z:s ·not accustl1r.::ed  to giving great weight  to .the  ... ; 
-.  ~  \ 
vie·ws  c:.:  Parli.m~-:ent,  but  :f.t  is nmv  clear that itwillbe a  key •. 
fact:>::  in cnsurir:g that  Cou.ncil  and Parliament.succeed·in 
!  ~  '  - . ; 
t.X~rking harmon:! ou;;;ly  together.  It will be essent(:ll  for 
thz Cour.:il  to  ·~how a  wilU.ngness  to use  the  procedure as  a 
r-::ar;s  of  est<::~lishin.;.; effective  partners~ip with Farli.r  .. r.ent 
on.~he  B~dzet through  ~lscus~ion of.prioritie~, the exer6ise 
of  poli. t:ica:t  rather  than purely technical judgements,  and  the 
.  ' . 
p~lrsu:.t of  cor:-•;>romise  when  necessary.  If the  Parlia.r:-~nt finds 
'.  . 
th  .. :;.;:  t'f~2  r::e1~tings with Council  continue  to have  inad~'qu.ate 
Co-...:~cil  ..:cticr.s, 
the  exchange  of views his  ~o visibl~ effect on 
then "conciliation'' could simply  become  a 
r.:ecl:..::;·ti.r:::-1  for creating frustration  among  &1Ps  and  add  to 
the  arc.:.s  o:.:  conflict between the  institutions..  Similarly 
E-'G s  r:c..:.:!  t.o  show  a  willi  ~.(jness  to use  the opportunities 
conciliation offers for achieving-a compromise with the  Council  • 
.  /. 
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•  / 
It w~ll heip considerably in ~stablishing 
effective  dialo~e between Council  and Parliament 
i 
I 
if both  institu~ions  ~an adopt  a  more ··disciplined ·and 
cchesive approach  to  t~e budget.  On  the Council  side·· 
this  rr.~ans  a  greater co-ordination between political 
s  t.J.·::err:~nts  by  Heads  of  Government  and Councils of 
Ministers., and· the. actions of Agrlcul  tural and  Budget .. 
Councils, so  that budgetary and legislative action 
follow Community  priorities.·  On  the Parliainept1s  side it··. 
\ 
means  ensuring that pressures  from specialist 
corr.mittees ·(transport,.regional policy,  energy, 
•  development etc•) for increased  spending in their own 
areas do  not  le'ad  to budgetary debates  and  amendments 
• 
-
being used  simply for making ineffective political_  .•  ~ . 
.  gest~res, a  discipline which  the directly elected 
Pa~liar:1ent,  Ul')like  its 'predecessor,  has made  som& 
progress .towards applying. 
• 
~ .-
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11 
·r have  so far referred only in passing to the role 
of  t:;.~  institution of which  I. am  Member,  the European 
. 
.  Co~5.s.;ion.  This is because  the  Commission;  although 
its work is a  central element ·in the budgetary procedure, 
is not part of  the  Budgetary Author! ty, .because  the most 
spectacular political clashes have  so far been  bet.wee-:1 
Council  and Parliament,  and because  the role of conciliator 
.  . 
which  the  Commission· is often _requir~d to  play can best be 
e?preciated after looking at the. scope for conflict.- nu! 
Coffir:.ission  gives  the ·Budget  its initlal political ste-er 
in presenting  the  "Pre~iminary Draft" and  providing all .the 
technical  information, it is represented at and.  participates 
in the discussions of Parliament and  Council  throughout,  and 
it executes  the budget after  ~ts adoption. 
I  ~~uld. not seek to claim that the  Commission has 
'  /' 
always  cor.1tributed sufficiently to  realis~ in the budget 
proposals it has  put forward •.  There  has  sometimes  been a 
tendency £:or  Commissioners  and Directors General,  like 
· Parlia::-.ent; t s  specialist cormnittees  and indeed like the 
·- ''spending" Departments in national  gove·~nts, to equate. 
'  . 
success in their area of work with the size of spending plans  • 
. . 
.J.· ~-~---~~~ 
.• 
---~------~----~--~-~ 
12  ..;. 
T::.e  ep?roech of "cash limits" in the  form of 
thi:!  Oi..,T.-..  r.a.so·ur.-ce5  Ceiling has nelped  to  impose  gre~te:r 
as  have  the new  pressures 
.,.  k,...  -"·. .......  •  .. :. ':\  .... v .............  ...;.  cirectly elected P  ..  "'lrlia.mcnt.  ~ertainly  '- , .. 
.  ~ 
bt.~dget proposal for 1980, 'Which 
I.:..-
-t:o  tba Budget· At~thori  ty as· a  soltltion· to ·  . 
.  , 
tb; iwpa.ss•e. between Parliament  and Council;  strikes·  the right ·  ' 
b.:lL::.:1:.:e 
/bet-....·ce.::. 
- ... 
:-:;::ed  for 
' .. 
.  . 
economies  and.the importance of 
be  achie~ed. 
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Th~ PROBLP-1  O:P  MALDISTRIBtrriON_ 
The  issue which lies at the heart: of the institutional  ,, / 
diff!culties  :I  have described is that of the maldistribution 
of Co:n:mmity  ;s·pendirlg,. and in pa~ticular' the  overwhelming 
.  1  . 
-~'-''eight:  of agricul  t\iral  spending in the· Community  Budget.  .  : 
JA.griculr:t:·-:e  i:s'  of course  the one  major internal policy area . 
'"'~ere  a  real  transfer of  compet~nce from  the national-to  the 
Co::: .  ...mity level has. been made.' Through ·the Common  Agricultural 
·,  '  '  a  '  ~  • 
Po~i.cy it is  org~nised and  financed on a  ~ommunity-:-Wide basis · · · 
~ '  ·. 
'  ~  '  -1"- ,_'  '  .>.,.• 
to.'hich  has no  counterpart  ~n other areas of government activity. 
/  ·It is I'lot  ·surp~ising  the~efore  that· it should dominate  the· 
'.\. 
•  budget.  ··No~ .should the CAP  car~y ·all -the  blame  for  the 
failure of the Community  to -develop other major common 
policies. 
/  .  / 
'  Surpluses  . ' 
~  ' 
·  · · !;onetheless it is right that the C»_  should-~  ·.a 
·.·-. 
:  -· ._ 
cause of concern.  ove-t  the last five years fts  ~ost has.  ~re 
than doubled  from  12,600 rnillioh DM  in 1975  to  27,500 million DM 
·  in 1979. 
.. 
It is difficult to justify an annual  increase lnagricultural 
expenditure vastly greater" .  ; 
.  .  .  than the  increase 
-.  in areas  such as regional,' social, industrial and  energy  policy -
.  . 
areas where  the Community  has  been active over the last S  years 
I  ' 
in developing  new  Co~nity measures.  _The  cause of this increase 
_ in costs. is essentially the increase  :Ln _quantities: of -
,_ 
agricultural produce  subject to intervention and other  su~port 
measures i.e. surpluses. 
• 
I 
I 
I 
I  .  .  . '  .. 
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There is no  easy or cheap solution to the problem of disposing  .  ~ 
,•  .  ....  '  . 
of these surpluses  one~ .they have  be~n produced,_ and it is  .  ,·-
\ 
on the  fact~rs giving rise to  surplus production tpat we  need 
to concentrate,.  The  problem is c·o.ncentrated particularly in 
the dairy se-ctor,  ~ere' surpluses of milk products last year  · 
. · ·took 45%  o::  all agricultural e:xpendi tt.ire,  or  3.27.  of. the .ent,ire  ~ . 
Co;.~.!r-:ity  Buc_;,et.  These figures  illu~trate the inescapable 
c'cn:1ection bet,;.;een 'ma~tering the problem of ,surpluses and 
-- . 
. curbing azricultural costs. 
\  '  '  \  _,:  .--
- -~  '. 
.  .  ·-
;  ',  ._  ..  ,  ' 
t<a.tters  should not· ·have been allO'Ned  to get to this 
-stage.  If the Corr..ission's warnings_ had not_been persistently 
ignored by the Council of Agricultural  Mi-nisters~ who  regu~arly. ' 
'  ' 
agree hi_£her price  increases in,the annual  prices settlement 
....  .-,  -.  < 
than are proposed by  the  Commission, the present  Cormriuni~y  · 
.-...  :  .··' .. 
'  crisis on both  agric:.u~lture and  finance might have  been avoided.  .  .  .  •·.  - '  . 
rsea  tmd  actUally  su.cceed~ng in turning it round~- . But it can 
be  dor:e  and it is essential that we  ~ake a' start. ' 'That :is 
'.  •  i  • 
~  .. y  the- Corr.mission has  in the last few months  made  a  two-protiged 
'  I 
attack on the problem:  we  have  proposed a  savings package,'a 
'  key  ~le~ent in which is a  tax on milk producers expanding 
~th:eir p-roduction,  arid  a  prices package  involv.ing lower 
'  ' 
increases in pl"ices for surplus products  than otherwise 
_r..ight  be  justified.  I£  implemented  the~e proposals provide 
.  .  '~  -
·  · · . the  opportunity for  ·  beginning  <:1  shift in the balance'  o~ the 
budget aw.:ly  f~·om agricultural expendi  t;ure. 
·. 
.  ' / 
.. 
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. The  Ct·.?  s~  S':'l  institution 
-'  I  ,  '. 
Their fate Will  now  be  determined 
.  I 
,j 
·by the Council of Ministers, who  should  take into account 
not only  the inter_estsfof  Comrrrunity.fanner~, but also the 
.  .  .  .  .  .  I  / 
ir:1pendin3  ex..'-1.:1us~ion  o.;  the  Comr:runity' s  o~  ~esources (and 
therefcre, the interests of t.::xpaye.rs),  and the need. to secure. 
in.the  pu.st  Fdcq;...lately  to  take  th~se wider considerations into 
~ '  .  ~ 
'-~  ~ ..  ,  ·~ 
,·.  ..... 
_  ~cco"!,l:'.t;  ha_s  to a  ~large extent flowed  from deficiencies in· the 
'< ,-.,··. 
' .... _ 
ins  t!. tuticr..al  arrangements  for detennining agricultural  policy'.~· 
~ow .that the  "impact of :agricultural decisions on other  a:_re~s of ' .· 
. Cou::::un!ty  actiyity hasbee.n highlighted i beli~v~ Jt  i~- ·t~~  .... 
:  .  ~'- .  '.  .  :  { 
to rr.ake ·_radical  changes  which will  end  what  has hitherto been 
,.  \  : 
the  "domaine  rese~ve" position of agricultural  policy~kin~ 
•  '  '  '  - -"  >  •  •  '  '  ...... -, 
.  '  '  .  .  . 
throughout .  the. Con:::::uni ty ins tl  tutions.  Until  now  decisions 
~  .  .  \  . 
- on agricultur3.l prices and related matters have  ~one through  the 
Council  en~{  r-ely 'unde·r  the auspices· of agricultural interests. 
Those  \..~!.th  a  broader  v~ew of Community. policies have not taken 
j 
suffic!.ent  inten~st in the process  ...  ...,  - , 
l.lis is true. at the' official level where  there is 
'··',_ 
a_  special CO:::.":'d.ttee  of officials to prepare  ~eetings of the· 
.  . 
Council  of  Ag~icultural Ministers,  instead of  the  normal  Committee 
.  :  •  .  .  .  .  I  .  . 
of·Permar.2nt Representatives,  generally known  as  COREPER.  It is 
/ 
also true at the highest_level where  the heads of government 
meeting in the European Counci.l.do not really seem to have  succeeded 
'  .  \  . 
. in puttinz agriculture onto  the  same  basis as other policies, 
·'· 
• .  l 
.  ' 
·. 
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I  know it is· ar~ed that· Ministers of Agriculture  ~  j 
are not cree.t'Jres apart ,from the  governments of wich they 
'  .  '  I 
are  ~e~bers, and  that their mandates  are worked out in the.  .  . 
national capitals ·so  ·ad .to  take account of non-agricultural  ..  . 
interests.  The  £act of the matter is, however,  that once  the 
Agricultural Council starts  th~y have  tim~_and again·shown· 
themselves able  to engage in trade-offs  betwe~n the various·  .  . 
·sgricultura~ interests that pay' little app~rent rega~d to  ~he 
,  . 
'., . 
interests of taxpayers  and  consumers,  or the limits ·of  Community·. 
finan'ce. 
A  fundamental  reform required is to bring 
. agricUltural  spending within the  budget framework  so that it 
·ts subject to financial  di'sciplines  and  viewed alongside 
other Com!'!ru.'l"lity·  policies.  A small  step in the  right direction 
was  taken by  the  European Council at Dublin when  it. was  agreed 
'·  '.  .  - -
'  that the, Corirr.J.ssion' s·  package of proposals for agricultural  -- .  i 
.,  ' 
savings  should  be  ref~rred to  the Finance 'SS  well ·as· the  .. 
Agriculture Ministers.  This  inevitably_ means  an  invo_lv~ment by 
Finance  M~nisters in setting the  framework  for the_prices 
"  ·  long overdue  ,  .  . 
settlement,  a/ move  towards  making agricultural policy financially . 
accountable.. ·  I. 
.. . 
,.  ' 
.• 
·'· 
I 
I 
I  .  .. I  . 
.I  ., 
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. The  Commission has· a  p~t to play in this as well. 
'When it starts to  formulate its proposals for ·agricultural 
- . 
pri~es and  connected measures it will have  to do  so within 
the  sa.-ne  context as its other policy proposals.  ·rnstead 
/'  , .. 
of dealing first with agriculture and  then with the rest 
it should  invariably consider- both together.  The  point 
·of det'arture  for  the whole  budget exercise would  therefore 
be  a  forecast  for  the  year ahead of income  and unavoidable 
. expenditure arising from  policie~ already in operation.  The 
next step WO\l,ldbe.to oecide how  much  money  COUld  be  mad~ 
available in. the  light o·f  the  Community's  overall financial.· 
'  if  -.  '  ~  • 
position to. develop  these  pol~cies and  to· initiate new  one~.·  .. ·· 
Within this assessment agriculture would  be  treated on the 
••  .  1 
same  basis as everything else.  The  inter-connection between 
agricultural and non-agricult\.lral  expenditure and  the fact 
'  - - - .>, 
that resour-ces  allocated to one  affect the  amount  available .. 
to the others would  thus  be  clearly established.  In.this 
/·way,  of course,  a  start would  be  made  on putting clear 
,  all  -.  · 
' 
~getary limits ?n the fulfilment of/our policy obligations. 
"  Such an approach would  be easier to bperate if the 
Budgetary Year and  the agricultural year could be made  to 
run more  closely together.  At  present Article  203 of the 
Treaty lays down  that.the  Budget  Year !s one calendar year, 
.  . 
while  the agricultural prices  settlement is ·  ·· 
·~'·  .  ..::.supposed· to  take effect from April 1,  though it is often 
delayed. fo-r  anything up  to  two months  or more. 
./. 
.  __-, 
·,  '., 
·I 
! 
' 
.  I ... - . 
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I  believe .;the  agricultural year and  the Budget year 
should be  the  same.  This would make ,it both natural and 
/ 
easy for the  Commission  and  the  two  arms_of  the  Budget 
I 
A'L!thority  to carry through  the  decisi:on-making process· 
·.for agricultural  and  non  agricultural expenditure on 'the 
'  ,· 
-. 
sarr.e  tim~table.  The  possibility of one  pre-empting the  . 
other as happens at present,  wou~d thus  be greatly reduceq. 
THE  E.X.'·tAUSTION  OF  CONXUNITY  REVENUE 
··"  At  the  beginning of  this talk I  referred to the 
·approach of  a  financial crisis for the Community,  and 
since  then  I  have  several  times  referred back to this 
point as  an  import~rit  ~ew factor in consideration of 
the  ~~dget.  Let me  now  outline what  the  Communities 
·' 
revenu~s are,  Why  they are likely to be  el_dlausted  soon, 
··and vmat  the implications of· that happening could' b~. 
Thea  revenue of· the Community  comes  from all 
. custo::-~s  duties, agricultural  (customs) 'levies,  and up 
to  li..  of  VAT  levied on a  uniform base.  These  are paid 
directly to  the  Community  from Member  States who  collect 
the~ on behalf of the  Community,  and  they are. therefore· 
·known as  Community  "own  resources". 
·'· 
, .. 
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Last year finance for Cormm.ini.ty  activit;ies  took 
all cf the  customs duties  and agricultural levies as · 
\.·~1: ss  three-quarters of  the  total potentially available 
·.  thrcuz!-:  "/AT,  or in other words  .. some  90'7.  of  the  Corr.rmmity's 
; 
pot:::ncis.l  o..-...1  -:-esources.  TI1is left a  margin for additional··· 
represe:1t:f.ng only  some· 5,000 million rM  or  les~ 
'th.::.n  of cur current expenditure on agriculture. 
The  Cc~~'ity is likely soon to exhaust this ·margtn 
for several  reas6ns.  First of  all,  there is the nan-
' 
·  1:;-...:~y.:::.~.::y  vf  c-:..::r  rever:.~1es, which  do  not  benef,it  f~cm t.."'le _ 
"fisc.ll cr.:,;'' on  \o:~·!!.ch. rn.:.ny  national .gove_rnments  rely.  It 
.  .  .  . 
·  is an  o~~~c~iv? of  i~ternational policy that  cu~toms-dutie• 
·.  <-~· ····.' ,~  ~  .......  •c·,::  ,~,.;...,,.A··a •  ..;d  the  income  from  them has 'tended  to 
'..,  •• ~ _._"._)  ~  .. w·  ....  .._,,..,.._~._,~,.""'  •• 
.{  .. 
.  .  .  .  '  .  '~ 
C~·t!i~.3  i:1  r~...:~l  terms. 
.  , 
VAT  i~ more  buoyant,  but  even  tcaking 
·'this  ir.~0. sccount our real overall revenue  seems  likely  over 
to  remain static.  Secondly  there' is the 
. cost o[  C'.!.e.q;er.ent.  nu~ accession of Greece. to Membership 
'. 
of_ t:·1.e  Cc:-::::r\llni ty in 1981,  possibly followed  in a  ,few  year~ 
..  . 
·. by Spain -e::-:d  Portugal, will lead to new demands  on the 
·  Ccrr.munity  Bucget  even  ~ithin the  framework of existing policies. 
A.~d  th:!.rdly  t!·lere is  t:1e  possible budget  cost of  the 
rescluticn of  d:e  "."$ritish problem"  wtli~h  could  -
.. 
l~~d  ~o significant increases in Community spending 
in  e~c L~ in 1980  and .the years following. 
·'· 
.; 
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:! 
'  ... 
.. 
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The  most  important factor of all, however,  is 
agricultural spending.·  The  increase in agricultural 
costs in 1979 was  only slightly less,than the total 
margin left in OWn  resources  ~hat year,  so it is not 
'  . 
hard ta see how  a  cavalier attitude by  the Agricultural 
Ministers  to budgetary costs  could quickly create a 
fir.~ncial crisis.  On  the fate of the  Commission's 
agricultural  sav~ngspackage and  low  price increase 
.proposals depends  the capacity of the  Corrmunity  to 
·.finance its future  activities~  It is not possible to 
be  precise about  the exact date when  we  will reach the 
ceiling,  given the  trade variations which affect our 
income  and our reliance on hypotheses  about future 
. 
expenditure  trends.  ·But if agricultural costs were  to 
.continue  to climb at the  same  rate as  .the  last S years 
·we  could run out of ~ney during  1981;  if the  Commission's 
agricultu~al proposals are  implemented .in full we  could probably 
stave off hit"ting  the ceiling before  the end of 1982.- .The 
latter would  provide  a  b~eathing space,  a~d the prospect of 
curbing agricultural costs over a  period of time,  but 
,  . 
we  still need  to-consider  pt;ovidi~g for an increase in 
·own  resources. 
. . 
• 
·'· 
! 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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w1ly  is this a  problem?  Because  the present 
I  I  , 
lir..!ts  to  "<'o;vn  resources",  and in  partic~lar the  1~ VAT 
limit, were  fixed/in 1970  by  a~ agreement having the 
force  of a  Treat}~,  which was  subsequently ratified by 
national  Parlia~ents.  Breaching  these  litni.ts has 
therefor~ a  profound political significance for nationaj. 
goverrM~cnts~  A Community  proposal  to  increase  the  VAT  -
,share  to  (say)  2%  would  have  to be  ratified-by national 
· Parli~ents and  governments  naturally and very properly 
view this p1C'ospect  with  some  reluctance.  There  are of  ·. 
course other possibil,ities,  for example  the interesting 
oil tax idea currently unde.r  discussion,· but  these need 
to be  further explored and  that could  take  some  time. 
I  .. 
A proposal  to incre.ase  own  resources  requires. the 
most  tho~ough scrutiny and  justification of existing· 
expenditure  to ensure  that· available resources are being 
.put to  gaod use.  In particular it is essential that 
the  Cor.J:.Jni ty  shows  itself able  and willing to control 
f.  • 
agricultural expenditure,  and  to  establi~h a better 
.balance between agricultural and non-agricultural expenditure  • 
.  '· 
' ) 
.  ' 
- 22  -
There  are  some  in national governments who  believe 
th!.s  can Qnly  be  achiev~d by  allowing the  Community  to 
r1.;n  out 
/ 
<?~·  money, i there  by  forcing  reforms  on  the  CJ.:P.  I 
that to  be  an abdication of responsibility,  w-hich 
/ 
gre.:1t  d.amage  to  the  Community  and  even result tn 
j 
in  ~hich spending  on  tegional  acd  socigl policy 
\o;.:s  s cr..;..::e.:::ed  out by  continuing expenditure  on  agri~ul  tural 
g:..:.- :::.~-:t·:cs.  We  rrr..;s t  ir:~pose reforms which are  in any  case 
' 
/ 
n..::c2s;.;~:;,.yr,  thoug:-t  of course given added urgency  by  the  pending 
exhaustion of own  resources,  and  plan our future financial 
activities in a  rational and disciplined manner.  The  fact 
that  sor::e  of  the t-;1ember  States which  are most  firmly opposed 
to raising the ceiling for Community  income  are also among 
those v.;hich  have  done  most  to  push up agricultural spending 
highlights  the  lack of coherent  thinking Which  seems  to be 
endemic  in national capitals on  the  Community  budget  • 
The  European Parliament,. in contrast to  the  norr..al · 
parli~entetyr position, has  powers· over expenditure  but no 
revenue raising powers.  This is a  gap  in the  Community 
budgetary  system which Hadame  Veil  quit~ r.ightly highlighted 
in her first speech as  President.  I  believe  that now  we 
have  a  puhlicly.ac~ountable European Parliament we  must 
seriously consider the  possiblity of  amending Article  201 
of  the Treaty so  as  to  ensure  that in future  the  power of 
the  Budgetary Authority  to  spend is clearly matched  by its 
responsibility for  increasing the level of own  resources  • 
.  /. 
.• 
• • 
.. 
,·· 
.. 
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CONCLUSION  · 
. What  should be our conclusions on  the Community  Budget? ' 
It is a  modest  financial  instrument by comparison with national 
budgets,  amounting  to only 2.6%  of  the total of such budgets 
in the  Community  last year.  ·But its size alone is not  the 
'  .  .  '  -
'· 
yardstick by  which it should be  judged.  The  important  thing 
is that it should  be  a  central policy instrument for  build~ng . 
the  European Community,  directing resources  to where  they 
'  . 
can most  benefit our citizens,  and helping to determine our 
priorities rat;her  than  mere~y reflecting th.e  accoUnting. 
consequences of decisions  taken elsewhere. 
If the financial activities of the  Community  are to 
achieve our  decla~ed objectives it is necessary that they 
'be embracedin a  comprehensive  Community  BUdget  which  provides 
a  ceritral overview of our s'trategy and our chosen instruments. 
That means  that our increasingly important borrowing and  _ 
lending  activiti~s,  and  the Community's  d~velopment·atd under 
the  Lome  Con\Eiltion  should  be  included in the  Budget ·- . 
which  they are not at present.  But it also means  that the 
~  ·. 
_financial  impact of Community  activities on Member  States and 
regions wfthin Member  States should not be perverse. 
·'· '. 
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In 1978  the  Comrndssion  published a  discussion document 
on the future  financipg of the  Co~nity Budget in which it 
,, 
arg....ted  that a  new  own  resource 'or indeed  an extension of an 
'  '  f  .  -
existing ovm  resource  ~hould not be  regressive in its  ~mpact 
.  .  I  . 
. on Mcmbe~ States~ and also  suggested  ~hat the  possibility 
of establishing the  principle of progressivity 
should  be  studied.  The  European Parliament has  since then 
~~de a  co~structive contribution in this area where it 
supported  the proposal  put  forward_by  the  German  Chairman 
of the  Budget  Committee,  Herr Lange,  that the  Community 
should  seek to further economic  convergence  be~een its · 
Me~ber States not only by  co-ordination of economic  policy,_ 
but also by  ~dopting ,  a  system of financial equalisation 
bnsed on per capita GOP  derived from experience-within 
the Federal Republic 
'  Tnis is not  the  time for me  to discuss these ldeas in detail 
but  I  do  believe that a  failure  to accept at Community  level 
the principle we  all.accept at national level,  namely 
that  those who  have most  should contribute most,  can not 
·' 
be  held  to  be  in the interests of a  cohesive  and  developing·. 
'  Co~~ity.  This  ~s not just a  question of the current 
problem of one  Member  State:  it is a  fundamental  question  . 
of principle for future  Community  budgets. 
·-
- ·'· 
' 
j 
• 
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The  role of  the  Community  Budget is complementary 
.  ~ 
to  t~:~t of national budgets,  but it can still be  significant. 
Strict public  expenditure control  ~st, of course,  be 
obscnred  .it:  the  Conununity.as  at the national level  and  there 
should be no  unnecessary duplication by  national  governments 
•.  '  '  . 
of activiti.es  transferred to  the·  Community.  I  believe  that 
Cor:!Il!t!nity  spending on areas such as  industrial and  energy  . 
policy will  and  should increase  significan~ly, but if 
. .  '  ' 
Co~nity taxpayers are  to get value  for money  this must  be 
rr.atched. by  economies  on agriculture.  .The  problems  of  achi~'.n.n& · 
... 
the right balance are considerable but given goodwill  in the 
.Council  of Minis_tcrs,  consistency in the  European Parliament 
and  a  firm and  principled stand by  the  European Commission in. 
defence of  the·  European interest we  can overc,orne  them and 
rr.ake  of the Comnunity·Budget  something Which  all our 
citizens recognise as influencing for  the better the  .. Europe 
1  ' 
in  'which  they live  •. 
• 
• 